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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects of news customization (tai-
loring news to consumers political preferences) on media bias. In
particular, we extend Hotellings duopoly location model to include
news customization. Customization occurs when a media rm supplies
the market with a continuous line segment of political opinions (i.e.:
multi-ideology rm), instead of just a single point on the line (i.e.:
single-ideology rm) as in the standard Hotelling model. The cus-
tomization strategy has some costs related to the adaptation of news
to consumerspolitical preferences, however, the advantage arises from
the possibility to price discriminate between di¤erent consumers. In
this set up, we show that the possibility to customize news by media
rms does not reduce media bias. Accordingly, in order to avoid erce
price competition in the standard segment (which also reduces the
revenues from price discrimination in the customized segment), rms
decide not to cover a larger variety of political opinions.
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1 Introduction
Media bias refers to the bias of the press in the selection of which events are
reported and how they are covered. In this sense, media bias can go against
the ethical and professional standards of journalism. Moreover, if the media
bias is provoked by a third party (like owners or vested interests), media
bias can jeopardize the constitutional and statutory rights of freedom of the
press, which are at the heart of western democracies.
The concern about media bias is related to the fact that the press is
regarded as the fourth power of democracies. Accordingly, democracies
have three de jure elected powers (an executive, a legislative and a judiciary).
Notwithstanding, the press is not an elected power (and therefore not a
de jure power), it is considered to be a de facto power given that it has
considerable inuence over public opinion (and therefore on the outcome of
elections, legislation and policy changes). For this reason, many have argued
that freedom of thought is threatened in the absence of freedom of the press
or in the presence of media bias (amongst others see Mill, 1859 and Hayek,
1945).
In recent years, media bias has gained increased attention in economics.
Events that have contributed for this are the war in Iraq (see Gentzkow
and Shapiro, 2006b), the 2002 US election (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007;
Gentzkow, 2006; Larcinese et al., 2007), the growing inuence of the satellite
network Al Jazeera in Islamic countries (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004), the
dispute in the US over the liberal versus conservative lean of the media
industry (Herman and Chomsky, 1998; Groseclose and Milyo, 2005; Knight
and Chiang, 2008), the intermingling between politicians and media groups
in countries like Italy (see Durante and Knight, 2009) and the debate in
Europe (and in particular in France) on the contribution of the media to the
so-called pensée unique (see Gabszewicz et al., 2001)1.
The main message from the studies mentioned previously is that media
bias is a pervasive characteristic of media markets. Together with the empir-
ical literature on media bias, the theoretical literature has been showing that
media bias can be the result of di¤erent factors such as pressures from adver-
1Gabszewicz et al. (2001) dene pensée unique (French for single thought) as a
social context in which discrepancies among citizenspolitical opinions are almost wiped
out. The expression is usually associated with the supremacy of neo-liberalism as an
ideology. This idea is expressed by Margaret Thatchers TINA argument (There Is No
Alternative) or Francis Fukuyamas thesis on the end of history.
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tisers (Gabszewicz et al., 2001)2; private information of journalists (Baron,
2006); media capture by interest groups or political parties (Noam, 1987;
Schulz and Weimann, 1989; Bovitz et al., 2002; Stromberg, 2001, 2004a;
Baron, 2005; Besley and Prat, 2006)3; and consumersprior beliefs (Mul-
lainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006a). Accordingly,
the rst three factors originate from the supply side, while the last one orig-
inates from the demand side.
Given the tendency of media markets to bias news (because of either
supply or demand side forces), the question in the literature has been "what
can reduce the media bias?" (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008). Accordingly,
the important issue to investigate is if di¤erent political views can nd voice
in the media market. The focus so far has been on competition, i.e.: whether
competition relatively to monopoly can reduce the extent of media bias (see
Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008). As discussed by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008),
competition is more likely to reduced media bias when the bias originates
from the supply side. However, when the bias results from the demand side,
the e¤ects of competition on media bias are ambiguous.
In this paper, we look at the issue from a di¤erent angle. In particular,
we investigate the claim put forward by some media experts that the Inter-
net revolution has increased the capacity of media rms to customize news
to consumerspreferences (see Sunstein, 2006, and Gentzkow, 2007). For in-
stance, the media and Internet expert Chris Anderson (2009), editor-in-chief
of the Wired Magazine, argues that one of the most important trends in the
media markets is the customization of news services via the Internet4.
In fact, to the best of our knowledge, so far the literature on media bias
has just considered that media rms can only provide one political opinion.
In this paper, we analyze the case when media rms can choose to provide
more than one political opinion. Accordingly, if newspapers decide to "sell"
more than one political orientation, the argument goes that media bias is
reduced. We thus analyze the e¤ects on media bias of the possibility by
media rms to customize news to consumersdiverse political opinions.
The importance of customization for market competition has long been
2See Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) for empirical evidence.
3For evidence see Besley and Burgess (2002), Stromberg (2004b) and Eissensee and
Stromberg (2007).
4One example of news customization given by Anderson (2009) is the premium subscrip-
tion of newspapers via Internet. When readers subscribe to a premium service, newspapers
are increasingly targeting news (and also advertisement) to the readerstastes.
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recognized in economic analysis (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978). More recently,
as a result of the new communication and information technologies (such as
the Internet), customization has become a central issue in marketing and
business analysis (see Balasubramanian, 1998; Bernhardt et al., 2006; Chen,
2006;Dewan et al., 2000, 2003; Gal-Or and Gal-Or, 2005; Jiang et al., 2006
and Syam et al., 2005). The focus in this literature is that the new technolo-
gies, by reducing the costs of screening consumerspreferences, allow rms
to hyper-targetand tailor products to consumers more e¢ ciently.
As we have discussed above, according to some authorities on media is-
sues, a similar trend seems to be occurring on the media markets. In order to
investigate if news customization can reduce media bias, we adopt the model-
ing strategy used in the media bias theoretical literature: the Hotelling model
(see Gabszewicz et al., 2001 or Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). In particu-
lar, focusing on the demand side driven media bias, we follow Mullainathan
and Shleifer (2005) assuming that consumers have political preferences and
that they su¤er a disutility from reading news that do not conform with their
political beliefs.
We extend the Hotelling duopoly location model to include news cus-
tomization. Customization of news occurs when a media rm supplies the
market with a continuous line segment of political opinions (i.e.: multi-
ideology rm), instead of just a single point on the line (i.e.: single-ideology
rm) as in the standard Hotelling model. The customization strategy has
some costs related to adapting news to consumerspolitical preferences, how-
ever, the advantage arises from the possibility to price discriminate between
di¤erent consumers. In order to customize news, media rms then face a
trade-o¤ between the customization costs and the ability to price discrimi-
nate the consumers that are o¤ered their preferred ideal-variety5.
In this sense, we follow the customization set-up introduced by Dewan
et al. (2003), where rms can o¤er more than one product at an additional
cost. Dewan et al. (2000, 2003) show that in the Salop circle (where rm
location is xed), rms have strong incentives to customize products in order
to price discriminate between di¤erent consumers. We di¤er from Dewan et
al. (2000, 2003) in that location in our model is not xed and rms compete
on the Hotelling line instead of in the Salop circle. Our objective is to analyze
5We therefore di¤er from the spatial price discrimination literature (see for example
Thisse and Vives, 1988; Eber, 1997; Lal and Matutes, 1989 and Braid, 2008), where
rms only o¤er one product, but rms price discriminate between consumers at di¤erent
locations.
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the e¤ects of competition and news customization on media bias and media
provision.
Contrary to Dewan et al. (2000, 2003), we show that when media rms
choose location they decide not to customize news. Therefore, even when
media rms have the possibility to customize news (which could reduce media
bias) with the benets of price discrimination, they even so opt not to do
so. The rationale for this result is that with news customization, media
rms increase price competition in the standard segment. Accordingly, erce
price competition in the standard segment also reduces the revenues from
price discrimination in the customized segment, rendering the customization
strategy not protable as a result.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
introduce the basic model of editorial political orientation and dene news
customization. In the third section, we study the customization and location
equilibrium of the model. We conclude by discussing our results.
2 The Model
Similarly to Gabszewicz et al. (2001) and Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005),
we adopt the Hotellings (1929) spatial competition model to study media
bias6. Since we analyze the e¤ects of news customization on media bias, we
depart from the standard approach with single-product rms by considering
multi-product media rms. In particular, we follow Dewan et al. (2003) by
allowing media rms to choose to o¤er customized products in order to sat-
isfy consumerspreferences. The di¤erence relatively to Dewan et al. (2003)
is that, while they work in the Salop (1979) framework where rms do not
choose location, we work in the Hotelling (1929) framework where rms can
choose location. Accordingly, in Dewan (2003) rms are symmetrically lo-
cated in the Salop circle, while in here rms choose location on the Hotellings
line.
The advantage of the Hotelling framework is that we can give a polit-
ical dimension to our model (in terms of left and right wing politics). In
fact, while Dewan et al. (2003) analyze the incentives to o¤er customized
6Our model is closer to Gabszewicz et al. (2001) than to Mullainathan and Shleifer
(2005). Accordingly, Gabszewicz et al. (2001), like us, are based on the standard Hotelling
(1929) model. In turn, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) add a behavioral framework to
the Hotelling model.
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commercial products, we analyze the incentives of media rms to o¤er al-
ternative political orientations. In this sense, a single-product rm in our
model is interpreted as a single-ideology rm (i.e.: a media rm that reports
to only one political orientation), while a multi-product rm is regard as a
multi-ideology rm (i.e.: a media rm that reports to alternative political
orientations).
ConsumersPreferences. As in Hotelling (1929), we assume that con-
sumers are uniformly distributed over a line of length one: [0; 1]. The line
represents readerspreferences in terms of political orientation. Political ori-
entation is ordered from left to right: 0 far left and 1 far right. We dene t
as the intensity of the readerspolitical preferences (i.e.: transport costs in
Hotelling). Readers patronize only one media outlet (i.e.: consumers have
unit demands). In this way, we have an ideal-variety-opinion model, where
readers have a disutility from buying a newspaper with a di¤erent political
orientation from their own ideal opinion.
Similarly, the location of a media rm on the line is interpreted as the
newspapers editorial political orientation. As in Hotelling (1929), we con-
sider a duopoly market structure, where the two editorial rms are labeled
as i = L;R. Newspaper L is left-oriented and newspaper R is right-oriented.
In this sense, rm L is located at point dL = xL  0 and rm R is located at
point dR = 1   xR, where xR  0. We interpret the rmslocation, xL and
xR, as the political core of rm L and rm R, respectively (see gure 1).
To our knowledge, most models that use the Hotelling framework assume
that rms can only supply one product (xL and xR, for rm L and rm R,
respectively). Accordingly, rms are located in only one location (i.e.: rms
are single-product). We di¤er from this standard approach by opening up for
media rms to customize media products to consumerspolitical preferences.
Then, in our model rms can become multi-product by covering di¤erent
political locations.
We then denote the rms customization scope by ki, which equals the
length of the Hotellings line chosen to be customized, i.e.: 0  ki  1, with
i = L;R. Media rms can then decide to adopt a single-ideology strategy or
a multi-ideology strategy. A single-ideology strategy corresponds to a single
point on the line (xL and xR), while a multi-ideology orientation corresponds
to a segment of the line ([xL; xL + kL] and [1  (xR + kR) ; 1  xR]).
In this sense, with a single-ideology strategy, a media rm only reports
6
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one political orientation. With this business strategy, a media rm o¤ers a
standard product to consumers with di¤erent political orientations. In turn,
with a multi-ideology strategy, a media rm subscribes to di¤erent political
ideologies. With this business strategy, a media rm o¤ers customized news
products to consumers in the customized segment and standardized media
products to consumers in the standard segment (see gure 1). In other words,
consumers in the customized segment pay for news that mirror exactly the
political orientation to which they subscribe, while in the standard segment,
readers pay for news that are closest to their ideal-opinion. Below we present
the specic customization technology available to media rms.
Denoting the location of a readers political opinion on the line as x, the
utility from a reader can then be measured as7:
U = v   pi   t (x  (xi + ki))2 , i = L;R (1)
Where v is a positive constant and pi is the price of newspaper i. We
assume that the parameter v is su¢ ciently large to ensure complete market
coverage.
Technology: News Customization. Media rms are prot maximizing
organizations8 which produce with constant marginal costs (zero without loss
of generality). In this paper, we are interested in studying the incentives of
media rms to customize news to consumerspolitical preferences. The cus-
tomization decision depends on the costs and the benets of news customiza-
tion. The costs arise through the adaptation of news to di¤erent consumers
political preferences and the benets accrue through the possibility to price
discriminate amongst the customized consumers.
Like in Dewan (2003), we assume that in order to customize, rms have
to incur a customization cost (C) that equals:
Ci =
k2i
2
, i = L;R (2)
Where  represents the informational and the exibility costs to adapt to
the readerspolitical preferences. In this sense, the customization costs can
7Following DAspremont et al. (1979), in order to have a location equilibrium we
assume quadratic transport costs.
8Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006b) provide evidence that this is the case for the US media
market.
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be seen as diseconomies of scope, given that costs increase with the number
of customized products o¤ered9.
Four notes should be made in relation to the location in space of the rms
customization scope10. First, media rm L has only incentives to customize
to the right of point xL (the political core of rm L). Likewise, media rm
R only considers customizing to the left of point 1  xR. Accordingly, media
rm L has no reason to customize to the left of point xL, because consumers
to the left of xL belong to its political "hinterland" (see gure 1). In other
words, like in Hotelling (1929), consumers located to the left of point xL are
captured by rm L, since they have no other option than consuming product
xL. The same argument can be made in relation to media rm R and the
consumers located to the right of point 1  xR.
Second, as shown in gure 1, a media rm can have at most two political
orientations that are consumed in the standard segment: the duopolists lo-
cation, xL and xR; and, in case of news customization, the end point of the
customization scope, xL+kL and 1  (xR + kR). Accordingly, the location of
the rm always represents a standard product since a media rm, indepen-
dently of news customization, will always deliver the political view mirrored
by its location on the line11.
Third, we assume that the political location of a media rm also deter-
mines where on the line it can customize. Accordingly, a newspapers cus-
tomization segment is contiguous to the rms political location (see gure
1). In this sense, the left-leaning newspaper (L) cannot customize sepa-
rately from point xL (and the same holds for rm R). The reasons why this
occurs might be related with either (1) the political preferences of owners,
journalists or interest groups; or (2) technological restrictions, in particular
diseconomies of scope. In the rst case, owners, journalists or interest groups
might not be willing to publish away from their political area. In the second
9Besides the quadratic costs of customization, Dewan et al. (2003) also have a linear
cost of customization. The inclusion of a linear cost of customization in our model does
not change our results, and therefore, for simplication we eliminate it from the analysis.
10Mussa and Rosen (1978) also model customization in a continuous spectrum. They an-
alyze vertical product di¤erentiation, however, and not horizontal product di¤erentiation
as we do.
11Note that if a rm chooses to customize and decides to locate at the extremes of the
line (0 or 1), the media rm has only one standardized segment. However, since we do not
know a priori if a rm is going to customize or not, the political location of the rm is
always considered to be a standard news product of the rm, even if a posteriori it ends
up being only consumed as a customized product.
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case, it might be too expensive to o¤er news products distant from the rms
ideological location12.
Finally, given that consumers in the Hotelling (1929) model buy at most
one political orientation (ideal-variety approach), we need to restrict the
customization segments of the two rms to not overlap.
The advantage of customization, following Dewan et al. (2003), is the
ability to price discriminate. In particular, if rms do not customize news
(as happens in the standard segment), media rms cannot price discriminate
between di¤erent readers, because consumersideal variety is not o¤ered. As
a result, media rms can only charge the standard products price pi, with
i = L;R.
Under customization, on the contrary, the media rms can price dis-
criminate, since they o¤er political news tailored to the consumerspolitical
preferences. Accordingly, in the customized segment the rm can charge the
customized consumer the standard products price (pi, with i = L;R) plus
the t cost of adapting the customized product from the closest standard
product. The t cost equals the distance to the closest standard product
times transport costs (t), since rms under customization are able to extract
the full surplus from the customized consumer.
Take the example of rm L (see gure 2). As we have seen above, rm L
can have at most two standardized political opinions (points xL and xL+kL)
and a series of customized political opinions on the line segment [xL; xL + kL].
Suppose that consumer x is located in the customized segment [xL; xL + kL]
and that the closest standard political opinion is xL (the location of rm L).
We then have that pL + t (x  xL)2 is the price charged by the news rm L
to consumer x. More generally we then have13:
12For example, to customize away from the newspapers political core, the media rm
might need to hire a complete new journalist sta¤ with knowledge of the opposite political
area (conversely, to customize contiguous to the newspapers political core, the media rm
might be able to continue to use the same sta¤).
13In the case that a rm customizes and it locates at the extremes of the line (xL = xR =
0), it could be argued that the price discrimination scheme should be made in relation
to the end point of the customized segment (kL or 1   kR). Accordingly, a rm could
extract higher surplus from the consumers located at the extremes of the line. If we do
this however, the duopoly game is not well behaved since the SOC for customization is
not satised.
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If xL < x < xL + kL2 ) pL + t (x  xL)2
If xL + kL2 < x < xL + kL ) pL + t (xL + kL   x)2
If 1  (xR + kR) < x < 1 
 
xR +
kR
2
) pR + t (x  (1  (xR + kR)))2
If 1   xR + kR2  < x < 1  xR ) pR + t (1  xR   x)2 (3)
Note that the computation of the revenues from the customized segment
can be extremely simplied with the aid of symmetry. Accordingly, as we
have seen, if rm L customizes news it has two standard products. Therefore,
the customized segment can be divided into two equally sized line segments
(

xL; xL +
kL
2

and

xL +
kL
2
; xL + kL

). In this sense, in the customized seg-
ment, we have two symmetric consumers in terms of distance to the closest
standardized news product o¤ered. To see this more clearly, take again the
example above. However, suppose now that the closest standard product is
xL + kL (instead of xL). The price of the customized political opinion for
this consumer is then pL + t (xL + kL   x)2. However, given the symmetry,
for two di¤erent readers in the customized segment of rm L, but located at
an equal distance from the two standardized political orientations of rm L
(xL and xL + kL), the price is the same; i.e.: if x   xL = xL + kL   x, then
pL + t (x  xL)2 = pL + t (xL + kL   x)2.
We can then show that prots in the customized segment for rm L equal
(and symmetrically for rm R):
Z xL+ kL2
xL
 
pL + t (x  xL)2

dx+
Z xL+kL
xL+
kL
2
 
pL + t (xL + kL   x)2

dx
= 2
Z xL+ kL2
xL
 
pL + t (x  xL)2

dx
= 2
Z kL
2
0
 
pL + tx
2

dx (4)
Prots for rm L and rm R are then equal to:
i = pi (Di   ki) + 2
Z ki
2
0
 
pi + tx
2

dx  Ci, i = L;R (5)
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0 1
Customized
segment L
Standard
segment L
Standard
segment L
Customized
segment R
Standard
segment R
Standard
segment R
xL xL+kL 1-(xR+kR) 1-xR
Note: L is located at xL. Points xL and xL+kL are the two end points of the
customization scope and also the standard news of L. Buyers in the left and in the
right hand side of the customized segment kL (i.e.: standard segments of L) choose
xL and xL+kL, respectively. Similar interpretation holds for R. Consumer x* is
indifferent between buying from L and R.
kL kR
x*
Figure 1: Customization: L located at xL and R located at xR
Where Di is the demand for newspaper i. Accordingly, DL = x and
DR = 1  x, where x is the reader who is indi¤erent between buying news
from rm L or rm R. The rst term in the prot expressions above refers
to the revenues from the standard segment, while the second term represents
the revenues from the customized segment (see gures 1 and 2).
Timing of the Game. The timing of the game is the following. In the
rst stage, editors select customization levels (ki, with i = L;R) and the
political location of the newspaper (xL for the left-leaning newspaper L; and
1 xR for the right-leaning newspaper R). In the second stage, editors choose
the prices for the standardized political orientation, pi, with i = L;R. As
discussed above the price of the customized product equals the price of the
standardized product plus the t cost.
Truth. The central question in the media bias literature is to analyze
whether rms have incentives to not report news accurately. In this sense
"truth" can be any point on the line T 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, media bias in our
model arises if the reported news (for rm L point xL, and for rm R point
xR) di¤ers from the truenews, i.e.: if T 6= xL and T 6= xR.
The main idea in the paper is that news customization may increase the
chances of reporting the truth, because rms report a segment of the line
and not only one point on the line. In the next section we analyze the validity
of this claim.
11
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Price
Standard news
product price, pL
0
Customized
segment L
xL+kL x*
Standard
segment L
t((kL/2)-xL)2+pL=
t(xL+kL-(kL/2))2+pL
x
t(x-xL)2+pL
xL kL/2
Standard
segment L
Figure 2: Price discrimination: L located at xL
3 News Customization and Location
In this section, we analyze the production, customization and location equi-
librium of the game. As usual, the model is solved by backward induction.
Accordingly, we start by solving for prices (pL and pR), and then for location
(xL and xR) and customization (kL and kR).
First, however, we need to nd the consumer that is indi¤erent between
buying from rm L and rm R. The indi¤erent consumer x is the one that
makes:
pL + t (x
   (xL + kL))2 = pR + t (1  x   (xR + kR))2 (6)
Solving for x we get:
Di =
pj pi t(xi+ki)2+t(1 (xj+kj))2
2t(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) , i; j = L;R and i 6= j (7)
Remember from above that DL = x and DR = 1  x.
Stage 2: Prices. In the second stage, rms choose prices for the standard
product. Prices can be found by substituting for x (equation 7) in the prot
12
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expressions (equation 5) and maximizing in order to pL and pR. The rst
order condition (FOC) for prices can be shown to be equal to:
@i
@pi
=
pj 2pi+t(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj))((xi+ki) (xj+kj)+1)
2(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj))t , i; j = L;R and i 6= j (8)
Note that the second order condition (SOC) for prices demands that
(1  (xi + xj + ki + kj)) > 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (all SOCs are in the ap-
pendix). This is a very intuitive SOC, since it simply implies that (xi + xj + ki + kj) <
1, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (i.e.: the sum of rmslocation and customization
levels cannot be larger than the size of the line segment of length one where
they compete).
Solving @i
@pi
= 0 and @j
@pj
= 0 for pi and pj (i; j = L;R and i 6= j), we
obtain the equilibrium prices:
pi =
t(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj))(3+(xi+ki) (xj+kj))
3
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (9)
Stage 1: Location. In the second stage, rms choose location (xL and
xR) and customization levels (kL and kR). We start with location and then
customization. To nd the equilibrium locations of rm L and rm R, we
solve the rst order conditions (FOCs) for location (dL
dxL
and dR
dxR
). We have
that the FOC for location equal for rm i (with i = L;R) equals:
@i
@xi
= pi

@Di
@xi
+ @Di
@pj
dpj
dxi

, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (10)
The rst and second terms inside the brackets on the right-hand side of
the previous equation are usually labeled in the Hotelling literature as the
direct and the strategic e¤ect, respectively. It is straightforward to show that
these two terms equal:
@Di
@xi
=
pj pi+t(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj))2
2t(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj))2
@Di
@pj
= 1
2t(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) > 0
dpj
dxi
=  2t(2 (xi+ki))
3
< 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (11)
Substituting for pi and pj (i; j = L;R and i 6= j) from equation 9 in @Di@xi ,
we have:
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@Di
@xi
=
3 5(xi+ki) (xj+kj)
6(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) , i; j = L;R and i 6= j (12)
It can be shown that at the symmetric equilibrium (i.e.: xi = xj and
ki = kj, i; j = L;R and i 6= j),

@Di
@xi

Sym
= 1
2
> 0. Then, as in the
standard Hotelling model (see Tirole, 1988), the direct e¤ect is positive,
while the strategic e¤ect is negative (i.e.: @Di
@pj
dpj
dxi
< 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j).
Accordingly, the direct e¤ect is positive given that a media rm increases its
demand by moving closer to the center of the line. However, as the two media
rms locate closer, price competition becomes ercer, depressing prots. The
net e¤ect equals:

@Di
@xi
+ @Di
@pj
dpj
dxi

=   (1+3(xi+ki)+(xj+kj))
6(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) < 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (13)
Then, in our model, like in other standard Hotelling models, the strategic
e¤ect dominates the direct e¤ect.
Substituting for @Di
@xi
, @Di
@pj
, dpj
dxi
and pi (i; j = L;R and i 6= j) in equation
10 we have:
@i
@xi
=   t(3+(xi+ki) (xj+kj))(1+3(xi+ki)+(xj+kj))
18
< 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (14)
Stage 1: News Customization. We now turn to the customization lev-
els, kL and kR. To nd the equilibrium customization levels of rm L and
rm R, we solve the FOCs for customization (dL
dkL
and dR
dkR
). We have that
the FOC for customization for rm i (with i; j = L;R) equals:
@i
@ki
= pi

@Di
@ki
+ @Di
@pj
dpj
dki

+
tk2i
4
  ki, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (15)
As for location, customization choices are a¤ected by a direct (@Di
@ki
) and
a strategic e¤ect (@Di
@pj
dpj
dki
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j). These terms equal:
@Di
@ki
=
pj pi+t(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj))2
2t(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj))2
@Di
@pj
= 1
2t(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) > 0
dpj
dki
=  2t(2 (xi+ki))
3
< 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (16)
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Substitute for pi and pj (i; j = L;R and i 6= j) from equation 9 in @Di@ki to
obtain:
@Di
@ki
=
(3 (5(ki+xi)+(kj+xj)))
6(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) , i; j = L;R and i 6= j (17)
Again, at the symmetric equilibrium (i.e.: xi = xj and ki = kj, i; j = L;R
and i 6= j) we have that

@Di
@ki

Sym
= 1
2
> 0. Then, as for the location choices,
while the direct e¤ect of news customization on prots is positive, the strate-
gic e¤ect is negative. The direct e¤ect is positive, since news customization
increases prots via price discrimination. In turn, the indirect e¤ect is nega-
tive, because news customization increases price competition in the standard
segment and consequently reduces the prots from price discrimination in the
customized segment. Remember that the price in the customized segment
equals the price of the standard segment plus the customization cost: if the
price of the standard segment is low the total price charged in the customized
segment is also lower.
We can show that the strategic e¤ect dominates the direct e¤ect given
that the rst term inside the brackets in equation 15 simplies to:

@Di
@ki
+ @Di
@pj
dpj
dki

=   (1+3(xi+ki)+xj+kj)
6(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) < 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (18)
Substituting the previous equation and pi from equation 9 in equation 15,
we obtain the following FOCs for customization:
@i
@ki
=   (1+3(ki+xi)+(kj+xj))(3 (kj+xj)+(ki+xi))t
18
+
tk2i
4
  ki, i; j = L;R and i 6= j
(19)
News customization then depresses prots through the decrease in the
revenues from the standard segment and through the costs of customiza-
tion (rst and third terms in equation 19, respectively), but increases prof-
its through price discrimination in the customized segment (second term in
equation 19).
Solution of the Model. The solution of the model is found by solving
@i
@ki
, @i
@xi
, @j
@kj
and @j
@xj
for ki, xi, kj and xj, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (equations
14 and 19). We obtain four solutions:
15
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(1) ki =
4
t
; kj = 0, xi =   (t+16)4t < 0 and xj =  14 < 0! xi = xj = 0
(2) ki = 0, kj =
4
t
, xi =  14 < 0 and xj =   (t+16)4t < 0! xi = xj = 0
(3) ki = kj =
4
t
and xi = xj =   (t+16)4t < 0! xi = xj = 0
(4) ki = kj = 0 and xi = xj =  14 < 0! xi = xj = 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j
(20)
As mentioned above since @i
@xi
< 0, then also xi = xj = 0 under all
the previous solutions. In what concerns, customization, the asymmetric
solutions (1) and (2) fail to simultaneously satisfy all SOCs. The symmetric
solution (3) satises the SOC for prices, location and customization if t > 8.
However for t > 8 the cross SOC is not satised (i.e.: d
2i
dx2i
d2i
dk2i
 

@2i
@xi@ki
2
<
0, i = L;R). Only solution (4) satises all SOCs (i.e.: @
2i
@p2i
< 0, @
2i
@x2i
< 0,
@2i
@k2i
< 0 and d
2i
dx2i
d2i
dk2i
 

@2i
@xi@ki
2
> 0). We then have:
ki = 0
xi = 0, i = L;R (21)
In this sense, a duopolist rm does not customize news and it locates
at the extremes of the line (maximum di¤erentiation). In other words, the
possibility to price discriminate via news customization cannot reduce media
bias when media rms compete on the Hotelling line.
To nd prices, we just need to substitute in equation 9 for ki, xi, kj and
xj (i; j = L;R and i 6= j) from equation 21 to obtain:
pi = t, i = L;R (22)
Summing up the possibility of news customization does not change the
basic results from the Hotelling model of spatial competition. The following
proposition summarizes the results from our model.
Proposition 1 In a duopolist media market with endogenous choice of loca-
tion, the duopolists locate at the opposite extremes of the line and they never
customize.
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4 Discussion
In this paper, we have analyzed the e¤ects of news customization on media
bias. We show that when media rms have the possibility to tailor news
to consumerspolitical preferences with the benet of price discrimination,
they still decide not to do so. In this sense, the extent of the media bias is
not reduced in the presence of news customization, since media rms choose
to not cover a larger variety of political opinions. The rationale behind this
result is that media rms do not wish to increase price competition in the
standard segment.
The results obtained here raise some important questions, and therefore
their robustness should be checked. In particular, it would be interesting
to investigate how news customization interacts with advertisement, biased
readers and biased editors-owners-journalists. Advertisement, as shown by
Gabszewicz et al. (2001), increases the pressure for a minimum di¤erenti-
ation of political orientations amongst media competitors. By customizing
media products, however, this pressure might be reduced, at least as long as
media rms can price discriminate between advertisers. Second, as argued
by Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), biased readers increase the incentives
of media rms to bias information. Though providing di¤erent products to
di¤erent consumers does not eliminate the nature of consumersbeliefs, at
least it safeguards the coexistence of di¤erent political orientations in the
media market. The drawback of news customization in this context is that
it may make it more di¢ cult for consumers to form accurate beliefs, as long
as they only listen to their own customized political views (see Sunstein,
2006). Third, we know from Baron (2006) that the bias that originates from
the political preferences of editors, owners, and journalists increases the ex-
tent of media bias. It would be interesting to check whether the incentives
for customization increase or decrease when media rms are committed to a
political location.
A Appendix
Second Order Conditions The second order condition (SOC) for prices
simplies to:
@2i
@p2i
=   1
t(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) < 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (23)
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The SOC for location is:
@2i
@x2i
=   t(1 (kj+xj)+2(ki+xi))(3 (kj+xj)+(ki+xi))
9(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) < 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (24)
In turn, the SOCs for customization equal:
@2i
@k2i
=   (1 (kj+xj)+2(ki+xi))t(3 (kj+xj)+(ki+xi))
9(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) +
tki 2
2
< 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j
(25)
Finally, the cross derivative simplies to:
d2i
dx2i
d2i
dk2i
 

@2i
@xi@ki
2
=
(2 tki)(1 (kj+xj)+2(ki+xi))(3 (kj+xj)+(ki+xi))t
18(1 (xi+xj+ki+kj)) > 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (26)
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